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A Control Group Study of Incubators’ Impact  
to Promote Firm Survival 
Abstract 
It is widely unclear as to whether start-up firms supported by publicly-initiated incubator 
initiatives have higher survival rates than comparable start-up firms that have not re-
ceived support by such initiatives. This paper contributes to the underlying discussion 
by performing an empirical analysis of the long-term survival of 371 incubator firms (af-
ter their graduation) from five German incubators and contrasting these results with the 
long-term  survival  of  a  control  group  of  371  comparable  non-incubated  firms.  The 
analysis covers a 10-year time span. To account for the problem of selection bias, a non-
parametric matching approach is applied to identify an appropriate control group. For 
neither of the five incubator locations we find statistically significant higher survival 
probabilities for firms located in incubators compared to firms located outside those in-
cubator organizations. For three incubator locations the analysis even reveals statisti-
cally significant lower chances of survival for those start-ups having received support by 
an incubator. We therefore arrive at the conclusion that being located in an incubator – 
contrasting the widespread rhetoric of policy actors and incubator stakeholders – does 
not increase the chances of long-term business survival. 
Keywords: business incubators, firm survival, control group, matching, survival analy-
sis, technology policy 
JEL Classification: L26, O38, M13, C41  
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Überlebenschancen junger Unternehmen und  
Technologie  und Gründerzentren:  
Ergebnisse einer Kontrollgruppenstudie  
Zusammenfassung 
Besitzen Jungunternehmen, die durch Technologie- und Gründerzentren (TGZ) geför-
dert werden, eine höhere Überlebenswahrscheinlichkeit als Jungunternehmen, die nicht 
von dieser Förderung profitiert haben? Oftmals wird dieser positive Effekt unterstellt; 
empirisch untersucht, wurde er jedoch bislang kaum. Die vorliegende Studie untersucht 
diese Fragestellung daher erstmalig für TGZ in Deutschland. Hierzu werden die Ent-
wicklungspfade von 371 ehemals durch TGZ geförderten Unternehmen und von 371 
Unternehmen einer Kontrollgruppe miteinander verglichen. Die Analyse umfasst zehn 
Jahre und insgesamt fünf Standorte. Signifikant höhere Überlebenschancen geförderter 
Unternehmen  gegenüber  der  Kontrollgruppe  sind  für  keinen  der  fünf  untersuchten 
Standorte nachweisbar. In drei von fünf Fällen besitzen die geförderten Unternehmen 
langfristig statistisch signifikant niedrigere Überlebenschancen gegenüber der Kontroll-
gruppe. Die empirischen Ergebnisse lassen Zweifel an einem positiven Einfluss einer 
Unternehmensförderung durch TGZ auf das Überleben der Förderempfänger aufkom-
men. 
Schlagwörter: Technologiezentren, Gründerzentren, Kontrollgruppe, Matching, Überle-
ben, Überlebenszeitanalyse 
JEL-Klasifikation: L26, O38, M13, C41  
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Control Group Study of Incubators’ Impact  
to Promote Firm Survival 
1.  Introduction 
For more than half a century, publicly funded incubation initiatives are at the heart of 
urban and regional technology and innovation policies for the promotion of entrepre-
neurship, to support first-stage development of new technology-based firms, to strengthen 
academic–industry linkages, and to promote innovation activities (OECD, 1997; Euro-
pean  Commission,  2002;  Hackett  and  Dilts,  2004).  Federal,  state  and  local  funding 
agencies worldwide have been, and still are, very enthusiastic in establishing incubation 
facilities, such as business incubators, science parks or technology centers. And in most 
cases they do this without profound knowledge of their actual effectiveness. Incubation, 
and the long-term outcomes of incubation can still be considered a ‘black box’ (Hackett 
and Dilts, 2008). 
However, what clearly can be observed is a major change in awareness by both academics 
and policy actors in favour of rigorous empirical evaluations to demonstrate long-term in-
cubation industry’s effectiveness. It is increasingly acknowledged that tracking the devel-
opment of incubated firms beyond the initial incubation phase, that is the post-graduation 
period, is critical for the understanding of overall incubators’ effectiveness. This change in 
awareness is, most notably, reflected in a recent initiative that is undertaken by the Na-
tional Business Incubation Association (NBIA, 2007). This initiative seeks to encourage 
managers of U.S. incubation programs to systematically and periodically collection of out-
come data of incubator graduates to track the long-term performance after they have left 
the protective environment of their incubating organization.1 Of prime interest within this 
program is the collection of data on graduate survival, since those statistics are considered 
to be most significant for providing evidence on incubators contribution.2 That said, NBIA 
(2007) concedes: ‘The fact is, no one has ever compared the survival of incubated vs. non-
incubated firms.’ Indeed, the limited evidence to date provides little insights regarding the 
contribution of incubation towards long-term firm survival. 
Given that the promotion of long-term survivability is one of the key objectives of incu-
bation, the lack of systematic research on incubator-firm survival is astonishing. This 
disregard is strongly dependent on the challenges associated with survival rates as vari-
                                                 
1  In fact, such an initiative to implement routinely conducted outcome reviews to gather graduate per-
formance data has been demanded for decades (e.g., Sherman and Chappell (1998); Bearse (1998)). 
2  NBIA argues that direct comparisons of separate data sets on firm survival in general and statistics on 
incubators’ graduate survival are widely inappropriate.  
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ables  of  incubators’  effectiveness  (Phan  et  al.  2005;  Schwartz  2009;  Sherman  and 
Chappell 1998 - these will be discussed in section 2.3). There also exist deficits con-
cerning systematically recorded data on formerly incubated firms (Colombo and Del-
mastro 2002; Hannon and Chaplin 2003). The crucial question, as to whether incubation 
acts as means to overcome the resource deficiencies start-up firms face in the first years 
after the market entry (Hannan and Freeman 1984; Stinchcombe 1965), can only be an-
swered by tracking the performance of incubated ventures after they have completed 
their incubation period (Hackett and Dilts, 2004; Hannon and Chaplin, 2003; Rothaer-
mel and Thursby, 2005; Schwartz, 2009). Although, specifically in Germany, scholars 
are cautiously optimistic regarding the survival benefits of incubation (Seeger, 1997; 
Elle et al., 1997; Pleschak and Werner, 1999), an empirical analysis is currently non-
existent. 
The present paper responds to the aforementioned deficits by conducting an analysis of 
the long-term survival of 371 incubator firms (after their graduation) and contrasting 
these results with the long-term survival of a control group of 371 comparable non-
incubated firms. Previous studies on incubator firm survival either cover comparably 
short time spans or have relatively small sample sizes. Whereas virtually all existing 
studies on incubator firm performance use cross-sectional data, the present study covers 
all firms that have graduated since the inception and track them over time, thus avoiding 
sampling bias (Siegel et al., 2003). We contribute to the literature in several important 
ways. First, most attempts to compare incubator firm survival with the survival of non-
incubated firms fail to identify appropriate control observations retrospectively, because 
official data sources do not maintain information on firms that have been subject to a 
market exit (Sherman and Chappell, 1998). The key advantage of our data (Creditre-
form) for this study is that, once registered, firms do remain in this database even if they 
have been subject to a market exit.  Second, a non-parametric matching approach is ap-
plied to identify an appropriate control group of non-incubated firms. Since incubation 
is not random (as we will demonstrate), using this matching procedure corrects for the 
selection bias and results in a well-selected control group. Third, the unique data set al-
lows us to apply techniques of survival analysis to broaden the analysis from a pure 
static comparison of survival/ closure rates towards a dynamic exploration of market ex 
its. We also take account of right censoring as well as left truncation. 
The following section presents our analytical framework, including a brief theoretical 
debate on the causes of high failure risks of start-ups and how incubators are expected to 
contribute  to  its  reduction  (2.1).  Moreover,  we  overview  the  incubation  industry  in 
Germany from 1983 to 2009 (2.2) and discuss the main methodological problems asso-
ciated with survival rates (2.3). Section 3 reviews empirical results regarding survival of 
incubator firms. Data and methodology are described in section 4. Empirical results of 
incubator firm survival versus survival of non-incubated firms are presented in section 5. 
Discussion is held in section 6.  
__________________________________________________________________   IWH 
 
IWH-Discussion Papers 11/2010  7
2.  Analytical Framework 
2.1  Why Start ups fail   and How Incubators are Expected to  
Reduce the Risk of death 
Incubator organizations (business incubators, science parks, research parks, etc.) theo-
retically can be understood as policy-driven instruments to respond to the ‘liability of 
newness’. Organizational ecologist use the notion of a ‘liability of newness’ to describe 
the considerable high failure risk that young or newly founded ventures face in the very 
first years after their market entry, because they do not (yet) possess enough or the nec-
essary resource portfolio they need to survive (Stinchcombe, 1965; Freeman et al., 1983; 
Hannan and Freeman, 1984; Brüderl and Schüssler, 1990). According to this hypothesis 
between age-dependency and firms’ death risks, start-up exit dynamics are characterized 
by a hazard rate that is highest immediately after market entry but decreases monotoni-
cally over time. Similar arguments are made by supporters of a ‘liability of smallness’ – 
hypothesis. Instead of focusing on age-dependency and firms’ death risks, this concept 
focuses on the impact of organizational size on firms’ death risks (Brüderl and Schüssler, 
1990), as an alternative explanation for declining failure risk with time (Geroski, 1995). 
The basic argument for both hypotheses is that (small) start-up firms are confronted with 
a considerable discrepancy between key resources that are crucial for their viability and 
their actual resource base. Larger, or more mature, firms can draw on a broader pool of 
resources to overcome problematic business situations. The amount of initial resources 
and  endowments  increases  with  firm  size  (Aldrich  and  Auster,  1986;  Brüderl  and 
Schüssler,  1990).  Stinchcombe  (1965)  points  out  that  new  organizations  lack  stable 
business relationships (with customers or suppliers), must learn their specific roles and 
tasks as social actors and have to develop routines – a process which takes time and in-
volves considerable costs. Furthermore, start-ups and young firms in particular do not 
possess any reputation and need some time to gain legitimacy in the market. At worst, 
they are associated with a rather negative image due to their novelty or because they 
have new products/ services. According to Hannan and Freeman (1984), firms with low 
reliability and accountability will be eliminated from the population. Therefore, young 
firms need to demonstrate that they are reliable and trustworthy business partners to-
wards  their  environment  (including  e.g.  customers,  suppliers,  or  investors).3  Subse-
                                                 
3  It should not be concealed that contrasting ‘liability-hypotheses’ have been developed that presume 
different  relationships  between  firm  age  and  hazard  development.  For  instance,  Brüderl  and 
Schüssler (1990) assume (and verify) an inversed u-shaped ‘liability of adolescence’, where there is a 
low risk of exit in an early phase of development, which increases afterwards and decreases mono-
tonically after a peak. They explain such patterns by a ‘(…) certain amount of initial resources and 
endowments (…)’ that all new organizations have. Until this individual starting-package (e.g. finan-
cial resources) is not completely depleted, the founder will do everything to preserve. In fact, results 
of prior studies trying to justify or reject one of these hypotheses vary considerably according to di- 
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quently, we illustrate why and how incubation should contribute to the reduction of high 
start-up mortality. 
The basic tangible and intangible ingredients of incubation (summarized in Figure 1) 
have been listed and discussed in numerous studies (e.g. Allen and McCluskey, 1990; 
Sternberg et al., 1996; OECD, 1997; Westhead and Storey, 1994; European Commis-
sion, 2002). Spatially concentrated, subsidized rental space, including offices, laborato-
ries, and small production space, helps to reduce early-stage fixed costs through co-
location and shared utilisation (Aerts et al., 2007; Chan and Lau, 2005; McAdam and 
McAdam,  2008).  Flexible  leasing  terms  ensure  the possibility  to  extend/  reduce  the 
space occupied by the firms immediately, depending on their actual business situation. 
A broad spectrum of collectively shared facilities and services (secretarial support, labo-
ratory  equipment,  communication  infrastructure,  etc.)  constitute  the  second  element. 
Particularly small firms or one-man businesses as well as firms from R&D-intensive 
sectors, such as biotechnology, face severe difficulties if they do not have access to such 
essential but often extremely expensive facilities and sophisticated equipment. 
Figure 1: 






Business  assistance  services  (for  example,  marketing,  accounting,  human  resources) 
constitute another cornerstone of incubation (Rice, 2002), in order to promote the under-
standing of vital day-to-day business processes. These services assist the incubated firms 
in areas where they do not possess the relevant knowledge and expertise (e.g. Allen and 
McCluskey, 1990; European Commission, 2002; McAdam and McAdam, 2008). Man-
aging resources and expertise, including business experiences, are key factors in identi-
fying, combining and exploiting the economic potential of the resource endowment of 
the firm (Barney, 1991; Mahoney, 1995). A firm’s image, and its reputation, (Fischer 
and Reuber, 2007), are highly valuable intangible resources (Barney, 1991). Naturally, 
start-ups and young firms in particular do not possess any kind of reputation or legiti-
macy in the market. This might have a negative effect on a variety of business interac-
tions – for example, negotiations with suppliers, customers or financing institutions. Ob-
taining the benefits of an image associated with an incubator location and acquiring 
                                                                                                                                               
verging regional, sectoral or temporal foci and heterogeneous sample populations (see Strotmann, 
2007 for an overview). 
 










__________________________________________________________________   IWH 
 
IWH-Discussion Papers 11/2010  9
credibility is another important mechanism of incubation (Ferguson and Oloffson, 2004; 
McAdam and Marlow, 2007; McAdam and McAdam, 2008). 
Efficient  networking  within  the  incubators  that  fosters  co-operative,  formal  contract 
agreements as well as informal interactions between the incubatees is seen as decisive 
for  a  successful  incubation  process  (Bøllingtoft  and  Ulhøi,  2005;  McAdam  and 
McAdam, 2008). As social capital theory states, social networks among entrepreneurs 
are seen as a critical strategic resource (Granovetter, 1985). Spatial proximity between 
incubator firms facilitates the transfer of information, knowledge and the exchange of 
experiences. Additionally, the incubator takes the position of an intermediary (Scillitoe 
and Chakrabarti, 2010), helping start-ups to establish contacts to incubator-external ac-
tors and to gain access to their resources and knowledge. Incubators’ network may com-
prise potential customers and suppliers, a wide network of specialized service providers 
(e.g.  lawyers,  tax accountants), financial institutions (e.g. banks, venture capitalists), 
public and private research facilities and political institutions (e.g. local development 
agencies, funding agencies). Such cooperative relationships can themselves even be un-
derstood as critical intangible resources (Uzzi, 1997; Gulati, 2007). Specifically linkages 
to academic institutions are relevant for technology-based firms to keep abreast of, and 
to acquire the most recent scientific knowledge (Link et al., 2007). 
Through the interaction of these support mechanisms, incubators focus on the compen-
sation of fundamental early-stage resource deficits of start-ups to ensure entrepreneurial 
stability, sustainable economic growth and long-term business survival. It is therefore 
expected that incubator support may increase long-term survival chances of incubated 
ventures. 
2.2  Incubation in Germany – A Brief Overview 
There are about 400 incubator organizations in operation at the end of 2009 in Germany 
(Schwartz and Hornych, 2010). Since 1983 when the first incubator opened in Berlin, high 
commitment by cities and municipalities in particular has led to the largest and one of the 
densest populations of incubators in Europe (European Commission, 2002). As the result 
of this high regional distribution, the number of newly opened incubators is decreasing 
since the end of 1990s. Similar patterns are reported for European incubators in general 
(Aerts et al., 2007) reflecting unfavorable economic conditions at the beginning of the 21st 
century (for example, the decline of investments; insufficient start-up activity). 
Incubation facilities in Germany are officially termed ‘Innovation Centres’ by the Ger-
man Association of Technology Centres (ADT), covering two types of incubator organi-
zations: business incubators and technology centres. While business incubators focus 
mostly on newly-founded ventures with little differentation regarding technological so-
phistication, technology centres mainly focus on innovative small and medium-sized 
firms (Sternberg et al., 1996; Tamásy, 2001; Baranowski et al., 2008). One could say  
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that business incubators aim at the reduction of the ‘liability of newness’ and technology 
centers aim at the reduction of the ‘liability of smallness’. However, this would be an 
idealized view because both types do not restrict themselves to one target group or an-
other and provide comprehensive support as detailed in section 2.1. Thereby, the name 
of an incubator organization does not necessarily reflect its ‘content’ (Tamásy 2001).4 
For instance, 16% of German incubator facilities call themselves ‘Science/ Technology 
Parks’ (Baranowski et al., 2008), but these facilities must be considered business incu-
bators or technology centres actually. For example, linkages to academic institutions are 
less pronounced than it is the case for science parks, such as in the UK (e.g., Westhead 
and Storey, 1994), the US (e.g., Link and Scott, 2003) or in Sweden (e.g., Löfsten and 
Lindelöf, 2002). Only few German facilities maintain formal linkages with higher edu-
cation institutions (Tamásy, 2001; Sternberg, 2004). Overall, the German concept of in-
cubation facilities corresponds closely to the definition of business incubation put for-
ward by the UKBI (UKBI, 2009). To avoid juggling with names, in the present study the 
term incubator will therefore refer to both German constructs. 
Table 1: 
Incubation in Germany 







































































































Average rental space: 5 964m² (additionally, 900m² 
of infrastructure space)  
Average number of tenant firms: 33 (seven employ-
ees) 
Over 16 000 firms have graduated (44 graduate firms 
per incubator location on average). 
23% of existing incubators are sector-specialized 
(mainly specializing in biotechnology and media-
technology) 
Three most important target groups (according to in-
cubator managers): innovative start-ups, technology-
oriented firms, academic spin-offs. 
Most important objectives: provision of favorable 
conditions for innovative start-ups, supporting re-
gional economic development, stimulation of re-
gional cooperation/ supra-regional networks. 
Most frequent technology fields of tenant firms: 
software, business-related services, consulting, tech-
nical services, ICT.  
Source:  Baranowski et al. (2008); Schwartz and Hornych (2010). 
                                                 
4  In practice, there exists a broad range of terminologies for business incubators and/ or technology 
centers. This heterogeneity, which is a well-known problem in incubator-incubation research (Hack 
ett and Dilts (2004)), makes it difficult to distinguish between both types of German incubator facili-
ties. Sometimes, a specific name for an incubator is chosen by its stakeholders primarily for market-
ing issues.   
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2.3  Some notes on Incubator Firm Survival rates 
This section shows those main challenges associated with survival rates, and failure 
rates alike, as indicators of incubator effectiveness that usually prevent scholars to tackle 
issues of incubator firm survival. These - partially interconnected - challenges are sum-
marized in Figure 2 and are briefly discussed below. 
First, survival rates are primarily criticized for their limited explanatory power, because 
of the systematic selection processes applied by the incubating organization prior to the 
incubation (1). Applying firms are screened according to a number of criteria (e.g. busi-
ness plan, financial budget qualifications of the entrepreneur, properties of the product) 
to  assess  their  future  success  chances.  The  result  is  a  considerable  selection-bias 
(Bearse, 1998; Sherman and Chappell, 1998; Phan et al., 2005). Firms with a high risk 
of not surviving do not usually pass the admission criteria. This incubator-specific selec-
tion process may induce relatively low failure rates, suggesting an overestimation of the 
effectiveness of incubators in this regard. Second, this endogeneity simultaneously lim-
its the explanatory power of so-called tenant survival rates (2). In Germany for instance, 
according to official data from ‘ADT’, the survival rate during incubation is more than 
90 percent. However, ‘since incubators are specifically designed to maintain and in-
crease life span’ (Phan et al., 2005:170) it is essential to include the firm after gradua-
tion from the supporting incubator when analyzing survival processes (Schwartz, 2009). 
Figure 2: 
Challenges associated with incubator firm survival as indicator of the effectiveness of 
incubators 
 
Survival and failure rates as indicators of incubators' effectiveness 
(1) Endogeneity 
/ selection bias 









Third, scholars refrain from using survival rates, because as sole indicators of incubator 
performance these measures are insufficient to capture the success of a particular incu-
bator (3). They may cover only one dimension of the complex support process (Hackett 
and Dilts, 2004; Bergek and Norrman, 2008; Schwartz and Göthner, 2009 for related 
discussions). For instance, there is no clear understanding whether the total number of 
firm survivals matter more for incubator assessment than the growth trajectories of the 
biggest successes.5 Survival rates alone, as any other indicator, are insufficient to pro-
vide a comprehensive picture of incubator performance. 
                                                 
5  Not to forget that market exit is a central element within an efficient economy as well (Strotmann, 2007), since 
new firms may induce improvements (e.g. on regional employment, improved competitiveness, acceleration of 
structural change), even if they fail (Fritsch and Mueller, 2004).  
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Fourth, benchmarking criteria or threshold values that indicate what rate of survival can 
be considered satisfactory are missing (4). Neither the incubator organizations nor local 
decision makers (local development agencies, politicians) define such criteria. If any-
thing, these are vague verbalized and therefore difficult to control. Therefore, definite 
assessments of survival/ failure rates are difficult. In this context, incubator idiosyncra-
sies must also be recognized (as fifth main challenge). The business incubation industry 
is heterogeneous (Hannon and Chaplin, 2003) and incubators are idiosyncratic regard-
ing, for example, their client needs and their regional context and underlying objectives 
(5).  Though,  superior  economic  objectives  of  incubators  are  widely  comparable  and 
therefore measures of success should be quite similar (Schwartz and Göthner, 2009; 
Ratinho and Henriques, 2010), the appropriateness of survival rates as success indicator 
may vary between different locations (Bergek and Norrman, 2008). 
Notwithstanding these criticisms, by no means firm survival may be ignored as measure 
of incubator success. Survival is the minimum criterion of entrepreneurial success and is 
at  first  the  most  important  attribute  of  firm  development  (Woywode  2004;  Tamásy 
2005). Accordingly, one of the primary objectives of incubators is the promotion of sur-
vivability  and  the  positive  development  of  their  tenant  companies  (Lalkaka,  1996; 
McAdam and Marlow 2007; Schwartz, 2009). 
3.  Prior Results on Incubator Firm Survival 
Below we give an overview over most important empirical studies that focus on incuba-
tor firm survival, with a particular focus on those empirical studies applying a control 
group methodology. Table 2 summarizes existing results of incubator firm survival. It 
must be noted that there is no uniform definition of firm closure in the literature. Het-
erogeneous data regarding the incubators studied (type of incubator, strategic objectives, 
industry focus, location, university linkages, entry criteria etc.) and firms included (ten-
ants  versus  graduates,  technology  orientation,  industry  affiliation,  age,  etc.)  must be 
considered as well as varying sample sizes. Overall, there is no perfect comparability be-
tween the results. 
Whereas few attempts have been made to explicitly explore post-graduation survival 
(Willms and Sünner, 2004; Schwartz, 2009; Seeger, 1997), most studies consider tenant 
survival rates (Rothaermel and Thursby, 2005) or have mixed samples, i.e. actual ten-
ants as well as graduate firms (Ferguson and Oloffson, 2004; Westhead and Storey, 
1994; Storey and Strange, 1992). Furthermore, only one study examines exit dynamics. 
Taking into account the problems of selection-bias and missing benchmarking criteria, it 
may be less meaningful to evaluate incubators’ effectiveness by calculating survival/ 
closure rates of incubator firms. One approach to cope with these issues is the applica-
tion of control group methodologies. Given their potential, one might suggest that con-  
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Table 2: 
Overview over reported closure/ survival rates of incubator firms (in descending order 
according to time span covered by the analysis) 
Author(s)   Year  Country/ 
region 







Willms and Sünner  2004  Germany  118 graduate firms from one incubator 
a  No  16   25.0 
Schwartz  2009  Germany  352 successful graduate firms from five in-
cubators
 b 
Yes  13  29.8 
Seeger  1997  Germany  133 graduate firms from 50 incubators  No  7   29.4 
Ferguson and Oloffson  2004  Sweden  30 science park firms (including 11 gradu-
ates) 
No  7   5.7 
Rothaermel and Thursby  2005  US  79 firms from one university-affiliated in-
cubator 
No  6   52.0 
Roper  1999  Israel  338 graduate ‘projects’  No  6  45.0 
Westhead and Storey  1994  UK  183 science park firms (including 9 gradu-
ates) 
No  6   38.0 
Storey and Strange  1992  UK  183 science park firms (including 68 gradu-
ates) 
No  4   16.9 
Glaser  2005  Germany  6 500 graduate firms from 150 incubators
 b  No  n. a.  17.2 
Aernoudt  2004  US  Graduate firms (no further information)  No  n. a.  13.0 
Sherman and Chappell  1998  US  Graduate firms (according to incubator 
managers) 
No  n. a.  13.0 
Notes:  For studies reporting closure rates for more than one time span, the longest reported time span (and the corre-
sponding closure rate) was extracted. 
a Explicitly excluding mergers and/or acquisitions. 
b Explicitly includ 
ing mergers and/ or acquisitions. Studies without superscript letter do not report their underlying definition of 
firm closure. 
trol group based studies are frequently used to assess value-added contributions of incu-
bators with respect to firm survival. However, this is not the case mostly because of 
non-availability of data.6 Little is known as to whether incubator-supported firms indeed 
have a higher probability of survival compared to comparable firms located outside such 
facilities. Westhead and Storey (1994) investigate performance differences between 183 
firms located on UK science parks and a control group of 101 non-science park firms. 
Over a period of six years, 38% of the on-park firms, but only 32% of the off-park firms, 
are considered failures (for their definition, see section 4.3). Therefore, the authors ques-
tion the impact of science parks on firm survival, which corresponds to the scepticism 
expressed for German incubators (see introduction). Contrasting these results, Ferguson 
and Olofsson (2004) find that Swedish science park firms have higher survival rates 
than comparable off-park firms. In their study, the authors investigate the survival of 30 
                                                 
6  In contrast to firm survival as dependent variable, other indicators of incubators’ effectiveness are much more 
frequently studied in control-group based analyses. Among the criteria that are most frequently applied are differ-
ent measures referring to innovativeness of firms, such as R&D intensity, patent activity or R&D expenditures 
(Colombo and Delmastro (2002); Westhead (1997); Lindelöf and Löfsten (2004); Squicciarini (2008); Radosevic 
and Myrzakhmet (2009)) measures of the cooperation propensity, particularly with academic institution (Colombo 
and Delmastro (2002); Fukugawa (2006); Yang et al. (2009)) or firm growth measured in terms of employment, 
sales or profitability (Westhead and Storey (1994); Löfsten and Lindelö (2002); Colombo and Delmastro (2002)).  
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new technology based firms located on Swedish science parks and compare the findings 
with  survival  rates  of  36  comparable  off-park  firms.  After  a  period  of  seven  years, 
93.3% of the firms originally located in science parks were still in operation versus only 
66.7% of the off-park firms. Eleven firms graduated successfully from the science parks 
and none of them failed. Although, there is a growing body of literature regarding the 
impact of incubation on firm survival, this brief overview demonstrates that to date 
there is only vague empirical evidence as to whether these instruments can be consid-
ered effective instruments in terms of the promotion of firm survival. 
4.  Data Collection and Methodology 
4.1  The ‘On incubator’ Sample 
We initially chose to restrict the present study to five incubator locations. This selection 
primarily was driven by the age of the particular incubator organization. A minimum 
operation time of at least ten to 15 years is commonly assumed to be essential to achieve 
reliable evaluation results (Autio and Kauranen, 1992; Schwartz and Göthner, 2009). 
All incubators chosen for this study were established in the early 1990s and exhibit an 
operation time of at least 13 years at the time this research project was started (spring 
2007). A short profile for each incubator is given in Table 3. Specifically, we include 
incubators located in the cities of Dresden, Jena, Halle, Neubrandenburg and Rostock. 
The incubators are comparable in terms of their non-profit orientation, age, maximum 
tenancy, the market strategy applied and with respect to their main objectives and target 
groups. All five incubators can be considered managed science-parks with a full-time 
manager on site (Westhead and Storey, 1994). 
For each of the five incubators, complete lists of all ever incubated and subsequently 
graduated firms and organizations from incubators’ commencement until December 31, 
2006 were submitted by the respective incubator management. A total number of 462 
firms and organizations were identified. This database was adjusted by removing 52 
non-private organizations (such as university institutions, public research laboratories 
and local development agencies). Firms that do not rent any physical office space but 
use the incubator address for their business mail were also excluded. Further 31 firms 
had to be omitted from the analysis because these firms could not be identified. After 
these adjustments, 371 firms that have graduated from the five incubators remained for 
the analytic purpose of the present study. These 371 firms form our ‘On-incubator’ sam-
ple.  
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Table 3: 
Main characteristics of the selected incubators 













1990  1992  1991  1990  1990 
Rental space   35 000m²  21 600m²  4 200m²  4 380m²  4 500m² 
Rent-level  High  Medium  High  Medium  Low 
Management staff  15  11  4  5  3 
Managed?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Market strategy  Diversified  Diversified  Diversified  Diversified  Diversified 
Profit orientation  Non-profit  Non-profit  Non-profit  Non-profit  Non-profit 


























































203  139  167  141  123 
Source: Authors compilation. 
4.2  The ‘Control Group’ Sample 
The  non-parametric  propensity  score  matching  (Rosenbaum  and  Rubin,  1983,  1985; 
Leuven and Sianesi, 2003) is applied to identify the ‘Control group’ sample(s). This 
technique matches incubated firms and non-incubated firms on the basis of important 
exogenous characteristics, and selects the best statistical twin from a group of potential 
control observations for each firm from the incubator sample. 
Previous studies in incubator/ incubation research use four important variables to iden-
tify an appropriate control group: firm location, industry affiliation, age of the firm and 
legal form (e.g., Colombo and Delmastro, 2002; Ferguson and Olofsson, 2004; Lindelöf 
and Löfsten, 2004; Löfsten and Lindelöf, 2002; Westhead and Storey, 1994). We adopt 
this approach for the present study. Though, data restrictions inhibit the exclusion of 
further variables in the matching process, there is some evidence for the advantages of 
relatively  few  explanatory  variables  (Caliendo  and  Kopeinig,  2005).  Data  (for  both 
samples) were collected using firm-specific information by Creditreform. Creditreform 
is the largest credit rating agency in Germany and collects detailed information on al- 
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most all firms in the German commercial register (see also Almus and Nerlinger, 1999). 
The key advantage of Creditreform data sets for this study is that, once registered, firms 
do remain in the database even if they have been subject to a market exit. In these cases 
Creditreform records the exact date of deregistration of business from the commercial 
register, the date of bankruptcy or the date of the merger contract. 
i.)  Firms from the ‘On-incubator’ sample are classified according the two-digit 
level of the NACE Rev. 2 classification of economic activities. Eight main in-
dustry-groups are built (Appendix C).7 
ii.)  Firms were classified in five start-up periods based on their year of establish-
ment. 
iii.)  The legal form of a firm (at the time the firm was founded) included as match-
ing criteria. This is important because firms with limited liability might face a 
greater risk of death due to a higher willingness to pursue risky projects (Almus 
and Nerlinger, 1999). 
iv.)  Firms’ location is given by the location of the respective incubator, i.e. by cit-
ies. 
In a next step, Creditreform provided for each of the five locations data on all firms in 
their database that have been founded up to the end of 2006 and matches one of the 
main industry-groups defined above. Using the same database for treatment observa-
tions and control observations is an important aspect (Heckman et al., 1999; Caliendo 
and Kopeinig; 2005), though often neglected. Over all five locations, 43 467 potential 
control firms were identified that did not receive public support by an incubator. Ap-
pendix C shows that the ‘On-incubator’ sample differs significantly in important charac-
teristics from the group of potential controls. Thus, incubator firms are a selective group 
of firms and incubator support is not arbitrary. 
To prevent biased results due to these significant differences, we apply propensity score 
matching. For every observation from the ‘On-incubator’ sample and the group of po-
tential controls, the vector of exogenous variables is condensed into one single measure: 
the so called propensity score. In the present application, the propensity score reflects 
the likelihood that a firm i has received support by an incubator, conditional on a set of 
individual characteristics xi: Pr(Si = 1 | X = xi), with xi given by the variables defined 
above. Propensity score are estimated using probit models. Relevant exogenous vari-
ables (industry affiliation, legal form, start-up period) are regressed on a binary depend-
ent variable indicating as to whether a firm were incubated or not. Location was not in-
                                                 
7  ‘Hightech-Manufacturing’ (NACE Rev. 2 codes 20-37), ‘Wholesale trade and retail trade’ (51, 52), ‘Construc-
tion’ (45), ‘Computer’ (including hard- and software, 72), ‘Research and development’ (73), ‘Consulting and 
business-related  services  (BRS)’  (including  engineering  consultants,  74),  ‘Education’  (80)  and  ‘Recreation/ 
sports/ culture/ others’ (including also non-knowledge based services like, for example, call-center and facility 
management 90-93).  
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cluded as exogenous variable. Since we are interested in a differentiated analysis, we 
performed estimation of propensity scores for each incubator location separately. This 
procedure is particularly recommended if heterogeneous effects for sub-populations are 
expected (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2005). The respective estimation results are not fur-
ther discussed here, but are provided in the Appendices A and B. According to Caliendo 
and Kopeinig (2005) all variables are fixed over time, measured at start-up. 
There are three general assumptions in the context of matching. First, the conditional 
independence assumption assumes that all relevant exogenous variables affecting both 
treatment and outcomes (survival) are observed. Second, the stable unit treatment value 
assumption demands that treatment of one particular firm (incubation) does not affect 
Figure 3: 
Distribution of the propensity scores before (left column) and after (right column) the matching procedure 
(Kernel density estimation, Gaussian Kernel); analysis per incubator location 
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Note:  ‘RCS’ = region of common support. ‘RCS’ determined by minimum-maximum-comparisons of the distribution of propensity 
scores between potential controls and ‘On-incubator’ firms. Upper/ lower threshold values for the ‘RCS’ are plotted via the 
dashed vertical lines. 
the  outcome  of  other  firms  (survival).8  The  validity  of  both  assumptions  cannot be 
tested empirically however. Particularly the conditional independence assumption seems 
problematic, because we might exclude relevant (firm-specific) variables, such as mar-
ket potential of the underlying business model. The third assumption refers to common 
support and assures that for every treatment observation a similar control observation 
can be identified. To fulfill this assumption, a region of common support (RCS) is de-
fined where propensity score estimates between treatment observations and potential 
control observations overlap. Observations outside the RCS are discarded. 
Sample comparison and quality of the matching result 
The left half of Figure 3 gives the distribution of the propensity scores before the match-
ing procedure  for  the ‘On-incubator’ sample and for potential controls. The RCS is 
given by the overlap between the two curves and is plotted via the vertical dashed lines. 
The RCS was determined by minimum-maximum-comparisons of the distribution of the 
propensity scores between potential controls and ‘On-incubator’ firms. The RCS varies 
between the five incubator locations and therefore the requirement to discard observa-
tions from the ‘potential-controls’ group. The large number of potential matching part-
ners per incubator location allows for exact matches in most cases (matching without 
                                                 
8  This would happen if incubated firms are kept alive at the expense of firms located in the respective city that have 
not been supported by the incubator and do not survive. This question has been raised by scholars in the past, 
who argue that firms might kept alive through incubation that would otherwise not have survived under market 
conditions (Sternberg (1992). However, to date there is no empirical evidence for such crowding-out in the con-
text of business incubation.  
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replacement; nearest neighbour). That is control observations are assigned only once to 
one supported incubator firm, with both observations having the same propensity score. 
The situation after the matching procedure is depicted by the distribution of the propen-
sity scores for the ‘On-incubator’ sample and the selected ‘Control group’ sample (right 
half of Figure 3). Further, Appendix C shows the distribution of important characteris-
tics between both groups. Both demonstrate that the matching procedure was successful. 
Propensity scores graphs nearly overlap perfectly. No significant difference for any rele-
vant exogenous variable is observed. This holds for each of the five incubator locations. 
4.3  Survival Analysis 
A firm is identified as closure or survivor at the end of 2006 based upon Creditreform 
data. This also means that the same data source is used for both samples ensuring ho-
mogeneity in the specification of firm closure across ‘On-Incubator’ and ‘Control group’ 
samples. In line with Westhead and Storey (1994), an independent firm is considerer 
closure, if it is definitely not identifiable as actively trading business at the reference 
date of December 31, 2006.9 Relocations are not regarded as closures, if the firm con-
tinues trading at the new location. Changes regarding the legal form are not considered 
as closures. Subsidiaries (e.g. trading office) are considered closure, if this subsidiary is 
not identifiable in the incubators’ city (even if the parent company continues trading) or 
the respective parent company was closed. This definition is chosen to enable direct 
comparisons with the results of Seeger (1997) or Westhead and Storey (1994) and in-
cludes all firms that ended up in liquidation or bankruptcy, firms that have been subject 
to a merger or acquisition10 and firms that are not actively trading business in any iden-
tifiable form. Considering the latter, Creditreform explicitly marks those firms that are 
still officially registered but do not actively have any identifiable business activity. 
An important objective of this paper is to shed light on market exit dynamics. We there-
fore apply statistical methods within a hazard rate framework (Lawless, 1982; Klein-
baum, 1996 or Cleves et al., 2004). Such techniques have the huge advantages of not be-
ing restricted to a dichotomous variable of surviving/ not surviving, to take into account 
the precise duration until the market exit and to account for censoring (Ferguson and 
Olofsson, 2004; Schwartz, 2009 for applications in the context of incubation research). 
A firms’ probability of surviving beyond a certain point of time t (measured in years 
since start-up) is reported by the survivor function S(t) [Equation (1)], with 0 ≤ S(t) ≤ 1 
                                                 
9  Firms that ended up in liquidation after the reference date (between January 1, 2007 and December 31, 2009) 
were explicitly not considered as closures. 
10  Regarding these M&A-cases, there are different ways how to classify them. First, assuming that those firms were 
successful, they may be count as survivors (Rothaermel and Thursby (2005b)), implying a narrow definition of a 
firm closure/ failure. Second, and certainly more exact, looking at the details of the respective deals/ merger con-
tracts (e.g. price or post-deal strategic changes) might create a solid rationale for classifying the M&A cases. Un-
fortunately, Creditreform does not report details about the deals, and an additional search (internet, business reg-
isters) did not yield any results.  
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and with T as a non-negative random variable that denotes the time of the event. Survi-
vor functions account for right-censoring, because there may be observations that do not 
experience  the  ‘event’  within  the  observation  period.  S(t)  is  estimated  by  the  non-
parametric Kaplan-Meier estimator (Kaplan and Meier, 1958 - [Equation (2)]), where nj 
is the number of firms at risk at time tj and dj the number of ‘events’ at tj. 
( ) ( ) ( ) S t =1  F t = P T >t   (1) 







n d n t S
|
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For the analysis of the development of closure risk over time, hazard rates h(t) can be 
considered additionally [Equation (3)]. Given our context, the hazard rate is defined as 
the firms’ probability that a market exit occurs in a given interval [t, t+￿t] (year after 
start-up), under the condition of having survived until the beginning of that interval. 
Hazard rates are also called instantaneous failure rates with 0 ≤ h(t) ≤ 1 (see Cleves et al. 
2004 or Kleinbaum 1996 for more details). 
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Left truncation 
For the ‘On-incubator’ sample, we must adjust for delayed entry, because we observe 
incubator firms from their start-up date but they enter our analysis only because they 
have started incubation. 169 firms from the incubation-sample already survived until the 
beginning of incubation and, obviously, could not have been failed before. Ignoring this 
pre-incubation period leads to incorrect values for S(t) and h(t) and a bias towards higher 
(lower) survival (hazard). We correct for this bias caused by left truncation by omitting 
firms from calculations in their truncation period (see Lawless, 1982:116-120; Cleves et 
al., 2004), leading to a reduction of the total number of observations under risk for each 
interval considered. Since our dataset contains exact starting dates of individuals’ incu-
bation periods, these firms enter the analysis at the time they start incubation (i.e. when 
they become at risk).  
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5.  Empirical Results 
5.1   Survival and Closure Rates 
This first sub-section presents empirical results on static survival rates over the entire 
observation  period.  Then,  sub-section  5.2  analyzes  exit  dynamics  using  a  duration 
analysis framework. Given the underlying definition of firm closure as specified in sec-
tion 4.3, Table 4 gives an overview over the number of survivors, the number of clo-
sures as well as the survival rates and closure rates for each of the incubator samples and 
the respective control group. We prefer focusing on survival rates since these are inde-
pendent of different interpretations, i.e. inclusion of M&A-cases as closures or survi-
vors. 
Regarding the ‘On-incubator’ samples first, distinct differences between survival rates 
can be observed. Whereas the survival rate for firms supported by the TZD amounts to 
70.6%, a comparatively low share of firms being supported by the TIGN of 40.6% sur-
vives long-term irrespective of the protective environment provided by the incubator. 
Except for the TGZH, a small fraction of 17 formerly incubated firms, accounting for 
10.8% of all market exits, have been the subject of a merger or acquisition. Overall, re-
sults in Table 4 underscore the need for incubator-specific analyses. 
Considering differences in survival rates between the ‘On-incubator’ samples and ‘Con-
trol groups’, a vague distinction between two groups of incubator locations can be made. 
For incubators located in the cities of Dresden (TZD) and Halle (TGZH), survival rates 
for both samples are approximately equal. There is also a slight tendency, though not 
statistically significant, that ‘On-incubator’ firms have higher survival rates than firm 
not receiving support by incubation. However, the second group of incubator locations, 
i.e. Jena (TIPJ), Neubrandenburg (TIGN) and Rostock (RIGZ) gives a complete differ-
ent picture. ‘On-incubator’ survival rates are far below the survival rates for ‘Control 
groups’ over the observation period. The most striking difference results for the TIPJ, 
where half of the ‘On-incubator’ firms survive compared to an almost 90% survival rate 
for ‘Control group’ firms. 
Prior research by Westhead and Storey (1994) claimed that higher closure rates for firms 
located in UK science parks result from the higher share of subsidiaries in these parks 
compared to Off-park locations; while survival rates for independent firms inside and 
outside these parks are virtually identical. Subsidiaries are frequently founded to benefit 
from relatively low rents, but are often closed by their parent companies with expiration 
of maximum tenancy. In the present study, the establishment type (subsidiary versus in-
dependent firm) does not make a difference. The aggregated ‘On-incubator’ sample in-
cludes 29 subsidiaries with a survival rate for this sub-sample of 58.6%. The aggregated  
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‘Control group’ sample includes eleven subsidiaries with a survival rate for this sub-
sample of 54.6%. 
Table 4: 
Static  comparison  of  survivors  and  market  exits  between  ‘On-incubator’  firms  and 












On  Control  On  Control  On  Control  On  Control  On  Control 
Sample total  85  85  56  56  95  95  71  71  64  64 
Survivors  60  59  37  36  51  85  29  55  36  47 
Market exits total  25  26  19  20  44  10  42  16  28  17 
Closures  21  22  12  19  39  10  42  16  26  16 
M&A  3  4  7  1  5  -  -  -  2  1 
Survival rate (in %)  70.6  69.4  66.1  64.3  53.7  89.5  40.8  77.5  56.3  73.4 
Closure rate total 
(with M&A; in %) 
29.4  30.6  33.9  35.7  46.3  10.5  59.2  22.5  43.8  26.6 
Closure rate 
(without M&A; in %)  
24.7  25.9  21.4  33.9  41.1  10.5  59.2  22.5  40.6  25.0 
Authors’ calculation. 
A closer look at survival rates according to the eight main industry-groups shows that 
the biggest gap in survival between ‘On-incubator’ firms and ‘Control groups’ can be 
observed for ‘Wholesale trade/ Retail trade’, ‘Computer’ and ‘Research and Develop-
ment’. For these three industry groups, survival rates are approximately 30 percentage 
points higher for ‘Control group’ firms. In contrast, for ‘Business related services’ only 
small differences can be found. For only one industry group (‘Recreation/ Sports/ Cul-
ture/  Others’)  ‘On-incubator’  firms  have  higher  survival  rates  than  ‘Control  group’ 
firms. 
Figure 4: 














90% 60% 30% 0% 30% 60% 90%
Hightech-Manufacturing (N=53/ 57)
Wholesale Trade/ Retail Trade (N=40/ 41)
Computer (Hard-/ Software) (N=68/ 66)
Research and Development (N=38/ 38)
Business Related Services (N=125/ 125)
Recreation/ Sports/ Culture/ Others (N=25/ 23)
On-Incubator sample Control-group  
Note: Industry groups ‘Construction’ and ‘Education’ are omitted due to very small sample sizes.  
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5.2  Market Exit Dynamics 
In analyzing market exit dynamics, it is of particular interest how hazard rates change in 
the first years after the market entry. Do incubators provide a supporting business envi-
ronment to reduce the comparable high failure risk start-ups face? The subsequent ana-
lyzes are based on closure rates including those firms that were subject to M&A. Previ-
ous research showed that analyzes of (incubator) firm survival and exit dynamics are 
remarkably robust if M&A-cases were treated either as survivors or closures, or if they 
would be completely excluded from the analysis (Schwartz, 2009; 2010). Six firms were 
omitted in the analysis, since an exact date of closure could not be identified. 
Table 5 gives the Kaplan-Meier estimates of the survivor function (Survival), the num-
ber of firms at risk (Risk), the number of firm closures (Deaths) and the hazard rates 
(Hazard). For comparative purpose, we report these measures for the aggregated sample 
as well. Additionally, Figure 5 provides the graphical representation of both survival 
curves and hazard rates for ‘On-incubator’ firms and ‘Control group’ firms according to 
the five incubator locations. As mentioned in section 4.3, survivor function give the 
probability of surviving the respective interval, whereas hazard rates specify the instan-
taneous risk of firm closure conditional of having survived until the beginning of this in-
terval. Analysis time as well as graphical representation is restricted to ten years, be-
cause of decreasing number of observations in the time intervals with simultaneously 
increasing observation time. 
First, with respect to the relationship between firm age and the development of hazard 
rates, there is no evidence for the existence of a specific high-risk period confronting ei-
ther ‘On-incubator’ firms or ‘Control group’ firms with high risks of firm closure. We 
do not find evidence for high hazard rates immediately after market entry (‘liability of 
newness’). 
Second, findings of Table 5 and Figure 5 reinforce the results of the previous section 
with respect to the two groups of incubator locations. For the TGZH and the TZD, only 
slight differences between ‘On-incubator’ firms and ‘Control group’ firms for the prob-
ability of surviving a period of ten years are revealed. For the TGZH, for instance, the 
survivor functions show nearly equivalent probabilities of surviving the ten-year period 
after start-up for ‘On-incubator’ firms (76.6%) and ‘Control group’ firms (77.1%). Ac-
cordingly, a log-rank test of equality of survivor functions does not indicate a statistical 
significant difference on the 10%-level between the two samples. Moreover, for these 
two incubator locations, the comparison of hazard rates between ‘On-incubator’ firms 
and ‘Control group’ firms does not indicate the presumed risk-reduction in the first 
years after the market entry.  
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Table 5: 
Life tables for ‘On-incubator’ firms versus ‘Control group’ firms 
Years since 
start-up 
TZD (Dresden)    TGZH (Halle) 
Incubator firms ( =84 )†  Control group ( =85)‡    Incubator firms ( =56)
 †  Control group ( =55) ‡ 
Risk/ 
Deaths  Survival  Hazard 
Risk/ 
Deaths  Survival  Hazard   
Risk/ 
Deaths  Survival  Hazard 
Risk/ 
Deaths  Survival  Hazard 
Up to 1 year  28/ 0  1.000  0.000  85/ 0  1.000  0.000    24/ 0  1.000  0.000  55/ 0  1.000  0.000 
1 to 2 years  40/ 0   1.000  0.000  78/ 3  0.963  0.038    32/ 2  0.939  0.065  53/ 2  0.963  0.037 
2 to 3 years  45/ 2  0.957  0.045  76/ 1  0.950  0.013    34/ 1  0.909  0.030  50/ 2  0.925  0.040 
3 to 4 years  51/ 0  0.957  0.000  73/ 2  0.925  0.027    37/ 1  0.885  0.027  49/ 1  0.906  0.021 
4 to 5 years  51/ 3  0.903  0.061  68/ 4  0.873  0.058    35/ 2  0.835  0.059  49/ 0  0.906  0.000 
5 to 6 years  51/ 2  0.869  0.040  65/ 2  0.847  0.031    34/ 2  0.790  0.061  43/ 2  0.868  0.044 
6 to 7 years  52/ 1  0.853  0.019  62/ 2  0.820  0.032    36/ 0  0.790  0.000  39/ 1  0.847  0.025 
7 to 8 years  51/ 3  0.804  0.061  59/ 0  0.820  0.000    33/ 0  0.790  0.000  36/ 1  0.824  0.027 
8 to 9 years  49/ 1  0.788  0.021  57/ 2  0.792  0.035    31/ 1  0.766  0.033  33/ 0  0.824  0.000 
9 to 10 years  46/ 1  0.772  0.022  46/ 4  0.731  0.079    28/ 0  0.766  0.000  30/ 2  0.771  0.066 
Years since 
start-up 
TIPJ (Jena)    TIG  ( eubrandenburg) 
Incubator firms ( =95)
 †  Control group ( =95) ‡    Incubator firms ( =68)
 †  Control group ( =71) ‡ 
Risk/ 
Deaths  Survival  Hazard 
Risk/ 
Deaths  Survival  Hazard   
Risk/ 
Deaths  Survival  Hazard 
Risk/ 
Deaths  Survival  Hazard 
Up to 1 year  57/ 1  0.980  0.018  95/ 0  1.000  0.000    38/ 5  0.840  0.141  71/ 1  0.986  0.014 
1 to 2 years  62/ 5  0.901  0.084  91/ 0  1.000  0.000    48/ 1  0.823  0.021  69/ 2  0.958  0.029 
2 to 3 years  67/ 3  0.860  0.046  86/ 2  0.977  0.023    49/ 3  0.773  0.063  67/ 1  0.944  0.015 
3 to 4 years  67/ 5  0.799  0.078  84/ 1  0.965  0.012    45/ 8  0.653  0.195  65/ 1  0.929  0.015 
4 to 5 years  63/ 5  0.741  0.083  80/ 3  0.931  0.037    44/ 2  0.625  0.047  64/ 0  0.929  0.000 
5 to 6 years  60/ 4  0.693  0.069  71/ 3  0.894  0.040    42/ 2  0.596  0.049  60/ 2  0.899  0.033 
6 to 7 years  55/ 3  0.657  0.056  65/ 0  0.894  0.000    40/ 1  0.581  0.025  54/ 2  0.868  0.036 
7 to 8 years  49/ 6  0.584  0.130  59/ 0  0.894  0.000    38/ 4  0.524  0.111  51/ 2  0.835  0.039 
8 to 9 years  41/ 4  0.532  0.103  54/ 1  0.878  0.018    36/ 1  0.510  0.028  42/ 2  0.797  0.044 
9 to 10 years  36/ 0  0.532  0.000  49/ 0  0.878  0.000    30/ 4  0.448  0.143  35/ 1  0.777  0.027 
Years since 
start-up 
RIGZ (Rostock)    Aggregate sample 
Incubator firms ( =64)
 †  Control group ( =63) ‡    Incubator firms ( =367)  Control group ( =369) 
Risk/ 
Deaths  Survival  Hazard 
Risk/ 
Deaths  Survival  Hazard 
  Risk/ 
Deaths  Survival  Hazard 
Risk/ 
Deaths  Survival  Hazard 
Up to 1 year  43/ 1  0.974  0.024  63/ 0  1.000  0.000    191/7  0.957  0.037  369/1  0.997  0.003 
1 to 2 years  48/ 1  0.952  0.021  63/ 0  1.000  0.000    230/9  0.917  0.040  349/7  0.978  0.020 
2 to 3 years  48/ 3  0.894  0.065  60/ 0  1.000  0.000    245/12  0.872  0.050  335/6  0.961  0.018 
3 to 4 years  50/ 1  0.876  0.020  58/ 2  0.966  0.035    248/15  0.822  0.062  325/7  0.941  0.021 
4 to 5 years  46/ 3  0.822  0.067  53/ 3  0.915  0.055    237/15  0.773  0.065  310/10  0.911  0.032 
5 to 6 years  43/ 0  0.822  0.000  50/ 2  0.879  0.040    230/10  0.740  0.044  285/11  0.878  0.037 
6 to 7 years  41/ 1  0.802  0.025  47/ 2  0.843  0.042    222/6  0.721  0.027  264/7  0.856  0.026 
7 to 8 years  33/ 6  0.680  0.200  42/ 1  0.825  0.023    202/19  0.659  0.099  243/4  0.843  0.016 
8 to 9 years  34/ 1  0.660  0.030  37/ 1  0.804  0.026    187/8  0.633  0.044  219/6  0.821  0.026 
9 to 10 years  30/ 3  0.600  0.105  34/ 1  0.781  0.029    169/8  0.604  0.048  190/8  0.788  0.039 
† Log-rank test of equality of survivor-functions between the five separate ‘On-incubator’ samples indicates statisti-
cally significant differences (Chi²=12.82; p=0.0122). ‡ Log-rank test of equality of survivor-functions between the 
five separate ‘Control group’ samples indicates statistically significant differences (Chi²=11.65; p=0.0202).  
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Third, with respect to the remaining incubator locations (TIPJ, TIGN, RIGZ), findings 
are  even  less  positive.  Log-rank  tests  indicate  statistical  significant  lower  survival 
chances for ‘On-incubator’ firms compared to ‘Control group’ firms. The most striking 
difference is found for TIPJ. Whereas for incubated firms, the probability of surviving 
ten years after start-up is 53.2%, non-incubated firms have a survival probability of 
87.8%.  Furthermore,  the  hazard  rates  for  TIPJ  ‘Control  group’  firms  are  quite  low 
(mean hazard rate of 1.3% over the entire ten-year observation period) and for every in-
terval considered below the respective hazard rate of ‘On-incubator’ firms (mean hazard 
rate of 6.7%). The respective graphs in Figure 5 give a good impression of these pat-
terns. 
Figure 5: 
Kaplan-Meier survival curves (left columns) and hazard estimates (right columns) for 
‘On-incubator’ firms versus ‘Control group’ firms according to incubator location 
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6.  Conclusions 
This paper provides insights on the contribution of incubation towards long-term firm 
survival. Therefore, a sample of 371 start-up firms supported by five German publicly-
funded incubation initiatives is tracked over time and is contrasted with the develop-
ment of an appropriate control group of 371 comparable start-ups not receiving support 
by an incubator. We analyze and compare survival rates as well as the evolution of the 
risk of market exits. 
The empirical results vigorously challenge the widespread rhetoric of policy actors and 
incubator stakeholders regarding the positive impacts of incubation on firm survival. We 
do not observe that firms located in incubators have higher survival chances than com-
parable firms located outside those incubator organizations. For neither of the five incu-
bator locations investigated, we find statistically significant higher survival probabilities 
for ‘On-incubator’ firms compared to ‘Control group’ firms. Nevertheless, for three in-
cubator locations the analysis even reveals statistically significant lower chances of sur-
vival for those start-ups receiving support by an incubator. Our somewhat disillusioning 
results seem to confirm existing concerns raised previously (Seeger, 1997; Elle et al., 
1997; Pleschak and Werner, 1999; Westhead and Storey, 1994). Given the empirical 
analysis of this paper, we arrive at the conclusion that being located in an incubator does 
not significantly increase the chances of long-term business survival. Conversely, the 
‘returns’ of an incubator location in terms of survival chances of start-up firms can also  
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be negative. In such, this study’s incubators tend to fail in reaching their most important 
objective. 
In this paper, matching of incubator firms with non-incubated firms to control for selec-
tion bias is performed along four key dimensions, i.e. location, industry, age, and legal 
form. Nevertheless, other explanatory variables that capture important characteristics of 
both samples and that might contribute to survival could not be included in the matching 
process, such as the influence of team members (Ensley et al., 2002), human capital en-
dowment (Acs et al. 2007), innovation and patent activity (Cefis and Marsili, 2006; 
Wagner and Cockburn, 2010), founding conditions (Geroski et al., 2009) or network 
embeddedness of start-ups (Shane and Stuart, 2002). Most in-depth characteristics can 
not be observed ex-post for discontinued firms since they had to be measured at firm 
foundation or close to start-up. A desirable approach could be the construction of a con-
trol-group of firms that did apply for incubation but ultimately did not become incu-
bated, as proposed by Sherman and Chappell (1998). Such research design, unfortu-
nately, is not practicable in Germany, because incubator management does not maintain 
such information. 
There exists no standardized incubator organization, that is no two incubators are alike 
(Allen and McCluskey, 1990; Sherman and Chappell, 1998). Evaluation of outcomes 
suffers from this lack of homogeneity, as already detailed in section 2.3. Incubators are 
mostly tailored to more or less specific regional circumstances and to characteristics of 
their target group, and are expected to fulfill different roles in regional innovation sys-
tems. Whereas in so called high-tech regions the commercialization of academic re-
search might be the primary incubator objective, for incubators located in economically 
depressed regions, the focus might be more on general economic development proc-
esses. Research could therefore focus on similar studies that compare differences in the 
contribution to firm survival according to the type of incubator, such as diversified ver-
sus more specialized incubators (Aerts et al., 2007) or profit versus non-profit incuba-
tors (Grimaldi and Grandi, 2005). This could help to answer the question which incuba-
tion model is most suitable to increase survival chances. 
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Appendix A: 
Correlation matrix;  =43 467 
Variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14)  (15) 
(1)  Incubator   1 
(2)  Start-up up to 1991  0.02  1 
(3)  Start-up 1992 – 1993  0.02   0.16  1 
(4)  Start-up 1994 – 1997  0.01   0.24   0.18  1 
(5)  Start-up 1998 – 2001  -0.01   0.26   0.19   0.23  1 
(6)  Start-up 2002 – 2006   0.04   0.29   0.22   0.31   0.34  1 
(7)  Hightech-Manufacturing  0.09  0.03  0.01  0.00  -0.01   0.02  1 
(8)  Construction   0.06   0.07   0.05   0.02  0.03  0.08   0.09  1 
(9)  Wholesale/ Retail Trade   0.05  0.11  0.04  0.01   0.04   0.09   0.10   0.52  1 
(10) Computer (Hard- / Software)  0.10   0.03   0.02   0.01  0.02  0.04   0.02   0.11   0.12  1 
(11) Research and Development  0.12   0.02  0.01  0.00  0.01  0.00   0.01   0.05   0.05   0.01  1 
(12) Business Related Services  0.03   0.05  0.00  0.01  0.01  0.02   0.07   0.35   0.37   0.08   0.04  1 
(13) Education  0.01  0.05  0.02  0.00   0.03   0.04   0.02   0.09   0.09   0.02  -0.01   0.06  1 
(14) Recreation/ Sports/ Culture  0.01   0.02   0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01   0.03   0.17   0.18   0.04   0.02   0.12   0.03  1 
(15) Limited liability legal form  0.09  0.07  0.04  0.01  -0.01   0.09  0.12   0.05   0.14  0.02  0.11  0.12  0.00   0.07  1 
Bold numbers indicate significant correlations on the 5%-level (two-sided test).  
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Appendix B: 
Results of probit estimations for the probability of receiving public support by an incu-
bator organization (standard errors in parentheses) 
Variables  TZD (Dresden)  TGZH (Halle)  TIPJ (Jena)  TIG  (Neubr.)  RIGZ (Rostock) 
Main industry groups           
Hightech-Manucfacturing  0.756  (0.133)
c  0.483  (0.217)
b  0.242  (0.177)  0.430  (0.327)  0.518  (0.219)
b 
Construction  -  -   0.849  (0.249)
c   0.937  (0.271)
c   0.920  (0.228)
c   1.184  (0.277)
c 
Wholesale Trade/ Retail Trade   0.404  (0.118)
c   0.772  (0.215)
c   0.475  (0.163)
c   0.813  (0.191)
c   0.584  (0.144)
c 
Computer (Hard-/ Software)  0.557  (0.166)
c  0.615  (0.205)
c  0.811  (0.177)
c  0.907  (0.216)
c  0.672  (0.156)
c 
Research and Development  1.040  (0.206)
c  0.925  (0.287)
c  1.283  (0.240)
c  0.791  (0.782)  1.110  (0.213)
c 
Education  0.149  (0.241)  0.322  (0.294)  0.497  (0.294)
a  -0.454  (0.490)  -0.360  (0.373) 
Recreation/ Sport/ Culture/ Other  -0.064  (0.201)  0.226  (0.190)  0.078  (0.235)  -0.168  (0.220)  -0.349  (0.256) 
Start up period                     
Start-up 1992 – 1993
   -0.043  (0.133)  0.440  (0.192)
b  -0.182  (0.207)  0.000  (0.221)  -0.903  (0.164) 
Start-up 1994 – 1997  -0.033  (0.114)  0.112  (0.190)  -0.216  (0.161)  0.221  (0.190)  -0.242  (0.154) 
Start-up 1998 – 2001   0.572  (0.163)
c  0.061  (0.188)   0.392  (0.160)
b  -0.183  (0.203)   0.249  (0.146)
a 
Start-up 2002 – 2006   0.483  (0.147)
c   0.426  (0.233)
a   0.695  (0.176)
c   0.760  (0.246)
c   0.704  (0.178)
c 
Limited liability legal form  0.451  (0.096)
c  0.518  (0.126)
c  0.595  (0.121)
c  0.268  (0.138)
a  0.327  (0.108)
 c 
Constant   2.575  (0.123)
c   2.445  (0.187)
c   1.720  (0.166)
c   1.349  (0.189)
c   2.235  (0.146)
c 
Observations  13 527*  5 040  2 574  1 333  13 876 
LR Chi²  193.00  129.83  202.57  117.96  189.56 
Pseudo R²  0.1871





Notes:  ‘Business Related Services’ serves as reference category. Start-up period ‘Up to 1991’ serves as reference 
category. Bold numbers indicate statistical significant coefficients. – 
a,b,c indicates statistical significance on 
10%, 5%, 1%-level. – * Potential controls were reduced by 7 117 observations that belong to ‘Construction’. 
No ‘On-incubator’ firm from TZD belongs to these branches. 
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